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Abstract
We investigate bidder collusion in one-sided ascending price auctions without com-
munication. If bidding rules in an English-type auction allow bidders to match each
others' bids, collusion can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium of a one-shot auction
game. Our earlier experiments show that in common value auctions with complete
information, collusion does occur and is sustainable even when bidders cannot explic-
itly coordinate their strategies. In this study, we investigate the robustness of bidders'
collusive behavior in private values, private information environments. We nd that
collusion still occurs as long as the bidders' gains from collusion are high.
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1 Introduction
The issue of bidder collusion in auctions has been gaining increasing interest due to the
growing use of auction mechanisms in government procurement and privatization programs
in many countries. Bidder collusion, if occurs, may be detrimental for both social eciency
and governments' auction revenue. It is therefore essential to investigate the institutional
features that safeguard against collusion and provide for socially ecient outcomes.
Collusion in auction markets has been studied by both economic theorists (Milgrom,
1987; Graham and Marshall, 1987; McAfee and McMillan, 1992) and experimentalists
(Isaac and Plott, 1981; Isaac, Ramey and Williams, 1984; Isaac and Walker, 1985; Clauser
and Plott, 1993; Artale, 1997; Kwasnica, 1998). Experimental evidence indicates that
while double oral auctions are not susceptible to collusion (Isaac and Plott, 1981; Clauser
and Plott, 1993), conspiracies can be quite eective in posted-oer and sealed bid markets,
provided that the sellers (buyers) are allowed to communicate between periods (Isaac,
Ramey and Williams, 1984; Isaac and Walker, 1985; Saijo, Une and Yamaguchi, 1996;
Artale, 1997; Kwasnica, 1998).
We study bidder collusion in one-sided ascending price oral auctions where no ex-
plicit communication among bidders is allowed. Many researchers argue that ascending
English-type auctions have an advantage over the sealed bid procedures in solving complex
allocation problems such as allocation of airwave licenses (McAfee and McMillan, 1996).
The advantage is due to a richer action space and a superior information feedback that
bidders get in iterative procedures as compared to one-shot sealed-bid auctions. How-
ever, it is also well recognized that these very features of iterative procedures make such
auctions more susceptible to bidder collusion (Milgrom, 1987, 1998; Crampton, 1998).
Fine details of institutional design may make a dierence in safeguarding against or in
facilitating bidder collusion.
We study the importance of the strict bid improvement rule (also called the increment
rule) in providing for competitive outcomes in one-sided ascending price auctions. If
bidding rules in an English-type auction allow bidders to submit bids of equal value, and
in an event of a tie, the seller randomizes equally among the bidders with the highest
bid, then collusion, if mutually benecial for all bidders, can be sustained as a Nash
equilibrium of a one-shot auction game even without communication. All bidders submit
exactly the same bid equal to the seller's reservation price, and the objects are assigned
randomly; deviations are deterred by trigger or bid matching strategies within the same
2
auction period.
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Our earlier results indicate that in a complete information environment
with a small number of bidders where all bidders have common valuations for the objects,
such collusion does occur in the oral auctions where bid matching is allowed (Sherstyuk,
1999).
2
The occurrence of collusion in a complete information environment with symmetric
bidders may not be surprising given a large body of experimental evidence which indi-
cates that, generally, symmetry and complete information helps to sustain collusion (Holt,
1995). In this study, we relax the symmetric valuations, complete information assump-
tion, and investigate the robustness of bidders' collusive behavior in private values, private
information environments. When all bidders have identical valuations, competitive bid-
ding invariably leads to zero prots to all bidders; the bidders have nothing to lose by
colluding. However, if objects' valuations vary across bidders and are their private infor-
mation, collusion may be harder to achieve and sustain. McAfee and McMillan (1992, p.
580) note that in order to collude, the bidders must resolve their asymmetric information
problem: they must have some way of selecting a winner. In a recent study of bidder
collusion in multi-unit sealed bid auctions with communication, Kwasnica (1998) reports
that the subjects did not use simple random assignment rules to allocate the objects, but
adopted collusive mechanisms that were more likely to assign the objects to the bidders
with higher values. This indicates that eciency considerations are important to subjects
in deciding on object allocations. In oral auctions where no communication is allowed,
it may be dicult for high value bidders to communicate their values to others without
triggering competition. Further, the bidders' expected payos in competitive equilibrium
are no longer zero; the opportunity cost of following competitive strategies is reduced as
compared to the symmetric valuations case.
1
McAfee and McMillan (1992) prove that, in a single-unit sealed bid auction where transfer payments
among bidders are not possible, the optimal collusion involves all bidders submitting the same (minimal)
bid for the object. The important dierence is that in the oral auctions that allow for bid matching, such
collusion can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium within one auction period; in the sealed bids, repeated
play is necessary to sustain collusive outcomes.
2
There is empirical evidence that auction rules that allow for bid matching lead to supracompetitive
pricing even if the ties in bids of equal value are not broken randomly. In Cook County (Chicago),
Illinois, contracts for tax lien collection are allocated in a sealed bid auction, where the ties are broken
in favor of rms who have large historical market shares. Firms in this market now face a class-action
antitrust lawsuit, alleging anticompetitive bidding. Another example is retail online auctions \Onsale"
(http://www.onsale.com) that use the \Yankee auction" format. In a Yankee auction, one or more identical
items are oered for sale at the same time. When the auction closes, the highest bidders win the available
merchandise at their bid price. Bids are ranked in order of price, then quantity, then time of initial bid.
During the auction, the information about the current highest bidders and their bids is posted at the web
site. Bidders can also post a comment together with their bid. Bid matching is very common in these
auctions, and comments such as \Keep it cheap" are not unusual.
3
Below we report on the series of experiments that allow us to assess how bidders'
collusive behavior is aected by the presence of private information on bidders' valuations.
Further, we investigate whether collusion is sensitive to the degree of asymmetry in bidder
valuations, payo gains from collusion as compared to the competitive equilibrium, and
subject pool training in other experimental markets.
2 Experimental design
To make a clear comparison between the complete information, symmetric valuation case
studied earlier, and the private information, private values case considered here, most of
the features of the experimental design are exactly as in Sherstyuk (1999). There are three
bidders in the market and two identical objects for sale. Each bidder demands exactly
one unit in a given period. The institution is the weekly ascending oral auction: each
subsequent bid submitted to the market has to be no lower than the highest outstanding
bid. The soft closing rule is used to end periods: the period is closed when no new bids
are incoming for 30 seconds. At the end of the period, the units are allocated to the two
highest bidders, provided that the bids are no lower than the seller's reservation price.
Ties in the bids of acceptances, if any, are broken by random choice of buyer.
3
In the benchmark experiments conducted at Melbourne university (Sherstyuk, 1999),
all bidders had the same value of 100 experimental francs for the object, which was common
knowledge. The seller's reservation price was 5 francs and was announced at the beginning
of each period. One experimental franc was equal to one Australian cent. We will refer
to these experiments as the benchmark common values (C) treatment. In the present
study, we consider two private values, private information treatments that dier only in
the support from which the bidders private values were drawn. In the low asymmetry
(PL) treatment, the values were drawn from the uniform distribution with the support
of [90; 100] experimental francs; in the high asymmetry (PH) treatment, the support was
changed to [50; 100] francs. Bidder valuations and bids submitted were constrained to be
integers. The seller's reservation price was 10 francs in both cases.
4
The distributions of values and the seller's reservation price were chosen so that ex-
pected payo gains from collusion relative to the competitive equilibrium were substantial
in all cases. However, in the low asymmetry [90,100] treatment the gains from collusion
3
Experimental instructions are available from the author upon request.
4
The reserve price of 10, instead of 5 experimental francs, was announced by mistake in the rst
experimental session, and was then replicated in each session. The dierence between 5 and 10 experimental
francs was negligible.
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were higher, and the expected payos in the competitive equilibrium were lower, than in
the high asymmetry [50,100] treatment. Theoretically, with 3 bidders and 2 objects, the
competitive equilibrium price is equal to the lowest value drawn among the three bidders.
If the values are drawn from the uniform distribution with the support [v; v], then, in the
competitive equilibrium, the expected payo of bidder i who has a value v
i
is:
EP
CE
(v
i
) =
(v
i
  v)
2
(v   v)
2
(v   v
i
=3  2v=3) (1)
If the bidders collude and all submit bids equal to the seller's reservation price p, then
under the auction rules considered, each bidder has a two thirds chance of buying the unit
at the minimal price.
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The expected payo from collusion, given a value of v
i
, is:
EP
Coll
(v
i
) = 2(v
i
  p)=3 (2)
Dene the absolute expected gains from collusion as the dierence between expected
payos from the collusive and the competitive equilibrium outcomes:
AG(v
i
) = EP
Coll
(v
i
) EP
CE
(v
i
) (3)
Incentives to collude can be also measured by the relative expected gain from collusion
which indicates the percentage gain from collusion relative to the competitive equilibrium
payo:
RG(v
i
) =
EP
Coll
(v
i
) EP
CE
(v
i
)
EP
CE
(v
i
)
 100% (4)
It is straightforward to show that as long as the seller's reservation price is no higher
than the lower bound of the support of bidders' valuations, the relative gains from collusion
are non-negative for all bidder types, but are strictly decreasing in bidder valuations. A
bidder who draws the value of v is certain to gain nothing in the competitive outcome,
and therefore has strong incentives to pursue collusion. On the contrary, a bidder who
draws v expects a positive gain from the competitive outcome; his incentives to collude
are therefore the minimal among all bidder types. Thus, we can compare the dierent
treatments on the basis of gains from collusion to the bidder with the highest value.
Table 1 presents such a comparison.
5
As long as the seller's reservation price is low enough, there is a continuum of collusive levels of
bids which give the bidders expected payos higher than in the competitive equilibrium. We focus our
attention on the outcome that is payo-dominant for the bidders in this class of outcomes, in the sense
that it maximizes the bidders' joint payo.
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EP
CE
(100) EP
Coll
(100) AG(100) RG(100)
Common values (C), v
i
= 100 0.00 60.00 60.00 1
Private values, low asymmetry (PL)
v
i
2 [90; 100] 6.66 60.00 53.34 800.9%
Private values, high asymmetry (PH)
v
i
2 [50; 100] 33.33 60.00 26.67 79.98%
Table 1: Absolute and relative gains from collusion for the highest type bidder with
v
i
= 100, given the reserve price p = 10. Payos and absolute gains are in experimental
francs; relative gains are in percent.
The present design allows us to answer two questions of interest. First, can a small
degree of asymmetry in bidder valuations break down the collusion that was observed
under the common values, common information treatment? Second, how does collusive
stability depend on bidders' incentives to collude, measured by the absolute and relative
gains from collusion?
There are two additional questions that we seek to answer in this study. One is whether
the absolute, or the relative payo gains from collusion are more important for collusion
occurrence and sustainability. Observe that both absolute and relative gains are higher
under the PL than under the PH treatment, provided that a common exchange rate is
used to convert experimental francs into dollars. Thus, we might expect the PL treatment
to result in more collusive outcomes due to the absolute and/or relative gains increase.
However, by varying the exchange rates for dollars across treatments, we can create the
high and low asymmetry treatments that have identical absolute gains from collusion in
dollar terms and dier only in relative gains, and thus investigate the eect of relative
gains alone.
The other question is how bidder collusion in our experiments depends on subjects'
previous training in other experimental markets. To answer these questions, we used two
subject pools in our experiments: Melbourne university students (Australia) and Caltech
students (USA). Most Melbourne university students had no prior experiences with exper-
imental markets. Most Caltech students have previously participated in a number market
experiments. The low and high asymmetry treatments with a common dollar exchange
rates were tested on Melbourne university subjects. The design that isolated the eect
of relative gains from collusion, keeping the absolute gains constant, was implemented on
Caltech subject pool.
The features of experimental design are summarized in table 2.
6
6
Table 2 shows that the dollar exchange rates in Caltech experiments were higher than in Melbourne
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Treatment # of session Exchange rate AG(100) RG(100)
Melbourne, low asymmetry 4 1 53.34 800.9%
Melbourne, high asymmetry 4 1 26.66 79.98%
Caltech, low asymmetry 4 1.5 80.01 800.9%
Caltech, high asymmetry 4 3 80.01 79.98%
Table 2: Features of experimental design. Exchange rates show the worth of one experi-
mental franc in cents (Australian and US cents, respectively). The absolute gains are in
cents; the relative gains are in percent.
Procedures The total of sixteen experimental sessions were conducted: eight sessions
at Melbourne university and eight sessions at Caltech. For each subject pool, four sessions
were conducted under the low asymmetry (PL) treatment, v
i
2 [90; 100], and four sessions
under the high asymmetry (PH) treatment, v
i
2 [50; 100]. The exchange rates used
to convert experimental francs into respective countries' currencies are given in table 2.
All experimental procedures, other than the private value draws, were identical to the
benchmark common values experiments conducted earlier at Melbourne (Sherstyuk, 1999).
Most Melbourne university subjects were rst or second year undergraduate students in
economics and commerce, all recruited through posted yers or class announcements. All
Caltech subjects were recruited through a web recruitment program; there were both
undergraduate and graduate students among the subjects. Each session was conducted
with three subjects. All sessions were conducted as non-computerized experiments; the
subjects were seated in a classroom, behind each other, and two rows away from each
other, to guarantee that they could not see each other's faces. No communication was
allowed. Each session consisted of 15 identical periods, preceded by one practice period.
7
Bidders' private values were drawn for each subject at the beginning of each period by the
experimenter. All bids together with bidder ID numbers were recorded on the overhead.
Ties in the bids of acceptance were resolved in front of the subjects by an assistant or
by one of the subjects, using cards marked with bidders' ID numbers. At the end of
each experiment, subjects were paid their earnings in private, plus $5 participation fee
(Australian and US dollars, respectively).
experiments for both PL and PH treatments. Thus, one could argue that incentives to collude were slightly
higher at Caltech than at Melbourne under both treatments. This argument is complicated by possible
dierences in subjects' opportunity costs and in purchasing power of Australian and US dollar in respective
domestic markets. As will be discussed in the next section, the dierences in the exchange rates between
Melbourne and Caltech experiments do not prevent us from answering the research questions of interest.
7
By a subject's request, one of Caltech sessions (PH-2) included two practice periods.
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3 Results
We rst compare the overall performance of auctions under the various treatments, and
then consider the role of bid matching is sustaining collusive outcomes.
3.1 Overall performance
The data from the four private values treatments are compared with the data from the
benchmark common values experiments reported in Sherstyuk (1999). The results pooled
by treatment and subject pool are summarized in gure 1 and table 3. Since the com-
petitive equilibrium price in a given period depends on specic realizations of bidders'
values, we cannot use the observed auction prices to compare the auction outcomes within
a treatment and across treatments. We use the following measure of auction competi-
tiveness. Let v
1
, v
2
and v
3
denote bidder valuations in a given period, ranked from the
highest to the lowest. Let b
1
, b
2
and b
3
denote the bidders' nal bids, also ranked from the
highest to the lowest. According to the competitive equilibrium prediction, b
1
= b
2
= v
3
;
according to the collusive equilibrium prediction, b
1
= b
2
= p. The percentage of market
competitiveness is given by:
Comp =
b
1
+ b
2
  2p
2(v
3
  p)
 100% (5)
The market competitiveness is at 0% in the collusive equilibrium, and is at 100% in the
competitive equilibrium. It will exceed 100% if the units are traded at prices above the
competitive equilibrium prediction v
3
.
8
FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE
The dynamics of average market competitiveness pooled by treatment is illustrated in
gure 1. Figures 2-6 in the appendix graph the dynamics of market competitiveness in the
common value auctions (benchmark) and the four treatments of the private value auctions,
by session. The gures also report, for each session, the average market competitiveness
and percentage of collusive-type matches in the end-of period bids (to be discussed in detail
in section 3.2 below). Descriptive statistics on market competitiveness by treatment are
summarized in table 3. To trace possible eects of subjects' experience, we divided all
8
This measure is closely related to the index of monopoly efectiveness used to evaluate the performance
of market insitutions (e.g., Davis and Holt, 1993, p. 134). We use the market competitiveness measure
since under our design, it closely traces, both graphically and numerically, the dynamics of auction trading
prices.
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Mean Comp. Collu- Total Early Late
(Stddv) Eq sive periods periods
Common values (C), Melbourne 100 0 21.03 23.17 18.72
(34.31) (31.62) (37.40)
Private values, low asymmetry (PL) 100 0 56.27 77.05 35.48
{ Melbourne (45.64) (35.81) (45.38)
Private values, low asymmetry (PL) 100 0 30.52 36.31 24.89
{ Caltech (42.42) (41.09) (43.55)
Private values, high asymmetry (PH) 100 0 103.43 103.00 103.9
{ Melbourne (6.95) (6.98) (7.00)
Private values, high asymmetry (PH) 100 0 45.23 66.23 24.23
{ Caltech (47.16) (43.64) (41.29)
Table 3: Market competitiveness in the weakly ascending oral auctions under common
and private value treatments, pooled data, percent.
observations into two time intervals: the early periods (periods 1-8), and the late periods
(periods 9-16).
9
Consideration of the data leads to the following results.
Result 1 Private values and asymmetry alone were not sucient to break down the col-
lusion in the oral auctions where the gains from collusion were high. Collusive tendencies
were present and persisted under the private values, low asymmetry treatment in Melbourne
experiments, and under both private value treatments in Caltech experiments.
Support: Figures 1, 3, 5-6, table 3. The average across experiments value of market com-
petitiveness under the private values, low asymmetry (PL) treatment was 56.27% (Mel-
bourne), 30.52% (Caltech); it was 45.23% under the private value, high asymmetry (PH)
treatment for Caltech. These values were below the competitive equilibrium prediction of
100% at the 5% level of signicance according to the t-test (one-tailed).
10
Moreover, the
competitiveness decreased from the early periods to the late periods in all three of these
treatments. 2
Result 2 The incidence and stability of bidder collusion was sensitive to payo gains from
collusion. Collusive tendencies became less pronounced and broke down as payo gains
from collusion decreased in Melbourne experiments. Collusion was sustained in Caltech
experiments where absolute payo gains from collusion remained high.
9
Period 1 was the practice period. We include it in the data analysis since it may contain valuable
information about the subjects' initial perceptions of the game.
10
In the t-tests, mean per experiment values were taken as units of observation.
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Support: Figures 1-6, table 3. For Melbourne experiments, where the C, PL and PH
treatment were clearly ranked by both absolute and relative gains from collusion, the mean
market competitiveness increased from 21.03% under the C treatment, to 56.27% under
the PL treatment, to 103.43% under the PH treatment. According to the permutation test
(Siegel and Castellan, 1988, pp. 151-155), the average per experiment competitiveness was
higher in the PL treatment than in the C treatment at the signicance level of 2.9% (one-
tailed). The average per experiment competitiveness was higher in the PH treatment than
in the PL treatment at the signicance level of 1.4% (one-tailed). In the PH treatment,
the market competitiveness exceeded the competitive equilibrium prediction of 100%. For
Caltech experiments, where the absolute gains from collusion were the same under the PL
and PH treatments, the hypothesis of no dierence in market competitiveness between
these treatments is sustained with the p-value of 30.0% (one-tailed). 2
Result 3 Previous training in market experiments and higher monetary incentives in-
creased bidder collusion: Overall, bidder collusion was higher in Caltech experiments than
in Melbourne experiments.
Support: Figure 1, table 3. The permutation test shows that the average per experiment
market competitiveness under the PL treatment was lower for Caltech than for Melbourne
with the p-value of 7.1% (one-tailed). The average market competitiveness under the PH
treatment was lower for Caltech than for Melbourne with the p-value of 1.4% (one-tailed).
2
Result 4 In Caltech experiments, the absolute gains from collusion were decisive for col-
lusion occurrence and sustainability: the amount of bidder collusion was not signicantly
dierent between the PL and PH treatments.
Support: See support for result 2. Remarkably, in three out of four sessions under the
PH treatment at Caltech, the payo-dominant collusive outcome was sustained in the late
periods: the market competitiveness was close to 0% (table 3, gure 6). 2
To summarize, we nd that under an auction institution which allows for implicit
coordination of bidder strategies, the incidence of bidder collusion strongly depends on
bidders' incentives to collude, measure by payo gains from collusion. Interesting dier-
ences in behavior are observed between an inexperienced and a well-trained subject pools
(Melbourne and Caltech subjects, respectively). The dynamics of Melbourne experiments
suggests that, as a rule, collusion emerged only after the subjects experienced low payos
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at the competitive equilibrium: consider the market dynamics in the early periods under
the C and the PL treatments (gures 2 and 3). Under the PH treatment, where the
competitive equilibrium payos were non-negligible, collusive tendencies never emerged
(gure 4). This evidence suggests that for inexperienced subject pools, collusion is driven
by relative, rather than absolute, payo gains. However, Caltech experiments demonstrate
that more experienced subjects pursue the absolute payo gains. As it is evident from the
PH treatment at Caltech, private values, high value asymmetry and non-negligible com-
petitive equilibrium payos were not sucient for the auctions to result in competitive
outcomes.
3.2 The role of bid matching
We now turn to the role of the absence of the strict bid improvement rule in sustaining
collusive outcomes. How often was bid matching used to achieve and maintain collusion?
To answer this question, we classify all auction outcomes into three types. We will call
an outcome collusive if the highest closing bid in the market is below the lower bound
of the private values support: b
1
< v. As discussed in section 2, in such an outcome a
bidder with any value (including the highest value of 100 francs) is at least as well o as
in the competitive equilibrium, provided that he has a two thirds chance of winning the
unit. We will call all other outcomes competitive. Further observe that collusive outcomes
may be of only two types: (i) Collusive bid matching outcomes, where all three bidders
have a positive chance of winning a unit within the same period (these involve three-way
symmetric matches in the highest bids, b
1
= b
2
= b
3
, or two-way asymmetric matches
in the lower bids, b
1
> b
2
= b
3
); or (ii) Bid rotation outcomes, where one of the bidders
stays (or prematurely drops) out of the competitive bidding process (hence, b
1
 b
2
> b
3
).
While collusive bid matching outcomes can be sustained as Nash equilibria within one
auction period, repeated play is necessary to sustain bid rotation outcomes.
Table 4 displays the percentages of auction outcomes by type, pooled by treatment.
11
The percentages of collusive type matches in the end-of-period bids (irrespective of auction
outcomes) for individual sessions are reported in gures 2-6. We conclude the following.
11
In the results reported in table 4, we classied outcomes as collusive if b
1
 (v  5) (not if b
1
< v); all
other outcomes were considered competitive. Under such a classication, colluisve outcomes guaranteed
minimal positive gains for bidders of any type, and were therefore qualitatively dierent from competitive
outcomes.
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# Competitive Collusive Collusive All
% of obs. outcome bid match bid rotation
PL { Melbourne, all 64 53.1 34.4 12.5 100
-early periods 32 71.9 15.6 12.5 100
-late periods 32 34.4 53.1 12.5 100
PL { Caltech, all 64 28.1 40.6 31.2 100
-early periods 32 31.2 31.2 37.5 100
-late periods 32 25.0 50.0 25.0 100
PH { Melbourne, all 64 100.0 | | 100
-early periods 32 100.0 | | 100
-late periods 32 100.0 | | 100
PH { Caltech, all 65 46.2 24.6 29.2 100
-early periods 32 68.8 18.8 12.5 100
-late periods 33 24.2 30.3 45.5 100
Table 4: Frequencies of auction outcomes by type, %
Result 5 Bid matching was the most frequently used method to achieve and sustain col-
lusion in Melbourne and Caltech low asymmetry experiments. Both bid rotation and bid
matching were used to sustain collusion in Caltech high asymmetry experiments.
Support: Table 4, gures 2-6. 34.4% of all PL outcomes in Melbourne and 40.6% of all
PL outcomes at Caltech were collusive outcomes which involved bid matches. In the late
periods, these percentages increased to 53.1% and 50.0%, respectively. In Caltech PH
experiments, 29.2% of outcomes were collusive bid rotation outcomes, as compared to
24.6% collusive bid matching outcomes; in the late periods, the percentage of bid rotation
outcomes increased to 45.5%. For individual sessions, collusive bid matching was most
frequently used in three PL sessions in Melbourne (PL-1: 68.7% collusive outcomes, PL-
3: 25% outcomes, PL-4: 43.8% outcomes), and three PL sessions and one PH session at
Caltech (PL-1: 37.5% outcomes, PL-2: 50% outcomes, PL-4: 56.2% outcomes, PH-1: 75%
outcomes). Collusive bid rotation was widely used in two PH sessions and one PL session
at Caltech (PH-2: 52.9% outcomes, PH-3: 62.5% outcomes; PL-3: 81.2% outcomes), and
in only one PL session in Melbourne (PL-2: 37.5%). The majority (over 80% for both
Melbourne and Caltech) of competitive outcomes did note involve bid matches of collusive
types. 2
Arguably, in an auction where explicit communication is not allowed, bid matching is
12
easier for bidders to adopt than bid rotation: under bid matching, the objects are allocated
randomly, whereas under bid rotation, the bidders have to nd a way to coordinate whose
turn it is to win the objects. It is then not surprising that inexperienced Melbourne
subjects overwhelmingly adopted bid matching schemes; what is fascinating is the ability
of Caltech subjects to adopt bid rotation schemes in some cases.
12
From the bidders'
perspective, bid rotation may have various advantages over bid matching. Bid rotation
eliminates uncertainty; if bidders take turns in staying out, then each bidder is guaranteed
to get the object in two thirds of the auctions in a session. Further, if bidders pursue
eciency and are somehow able to communicate a likely ranking of their private valuations,
then bid rotation can achieve higher market eciency than bid matching. The market
eciency is dened as the percentage of the maximal social surplus realized in the market:
Eff =
P
3
i=1
v
i
x
i
  2p
v
1
+ v
2
  2p
 100%; (6)
where v
i
and x
i
denote the object valuation and the assignment coecient of bidder i
(x
i
= 1 if bidder i wins the object, and x
i
= 0 otherwise), and v
j
denotes the j-th highest
value drawn among the bidders. Under the competitive equilibrium prediction, the market
eciency is 100%; under collusion, eciency losses occur unless the bidders nd a way to
allocate the objects to the bidders with the two highest values.
Consider whether, in fact, collusion resulted in eciency losses in our experiments, and
whether bid rotation outcomes were any dierent from bid matching outcomes in terms of
their eciency. Table 5 displays the theoretically predicted and experimentally observed
market eciencies by treatment and by type of outcome.
13
Interestingly, we nd that
eciency losses under collusion were minimal and below the theoretical predictions.
Result 6 Overall, there were no eciency losses due to collusion in either Melbourne
or Caltech experiments. The average market eciency under collusive outcomes was no
dierent than under competitive outcomes. The eciency of collusive outcomes under
the PH treatment at Caltech was higher than theoretically predicted. The dierences in
eciencies between the bid matching and bid rotation outcomes were minimal.
12
Coordination problems may be easier to overcome if subjects in the same session knew each other. We
did not allow any sessions in which all three subjects were aquainted with each other. In both Melbourne
and Caltech experiments, there were some sessions where two subjects knew each other; the number of
such sessions was about the same at Melbourne and Caltech.
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The theoretical predictions for bid rotation outcomes given in table 5 were obtained assuming that
the objects are allocated to bidders in turn and independently of their private valuations. The predicted
eciencies are therefore identical for the bid rotation and bid matching collusive outcomes. The estimates
of the eciencies of collusive outcomes were obtained through computer simulations.
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Mean, % Competitive Collusive Collusive All
(Stddv) outcome bid match bid rotation
PL { predicted 100 98.56 98.56 |
(0) (1.53) (1.53)
{ Melbourne data 97.93 98.38 97.98 98.10
(9.46) (1.56) (1.92) (6.94)
{ Caltech data 96.53 98.21 97.96 97.66
(0.13) (1.90) (2.03) (7.08)
PH { predicted 100 91.32 91.32 |
(0) (9.00) (9.00)
{ Melbourne data 99.63 | | 99.63
(1.47) (1.47)
{ Caltech data 96.94 94.57 96.57 96.25
(0.10) (9.08) (6.15) (8.98)
Table 5: Market eciencies of auction outcomes by type, %
Support: Table 5. In the PL treatments at both Melbourne and Caltech, the average mar-
ket eciencies under competitive outcomes were no higher than under either collusive bid
matching or bid rotation outcomes. In the PH experiments at Caltech, the average market
eciencies under collusive and bid matching outcomes were 94.57% and 96.57%, respec-
tively, as compared to 96.94% for competitive outcomes, and the theoretical prediction of
91.32% for collusive outcomes. 2
4 Discussion
The above results provide interesting insight into the nature and stability of bidder col-
lusion in oral auctions with a small number of bidders. We conclude that it is not the
complete information and symmetry as such that is necessary for the emergence and sus-
tainability of collusion. Rather, it is the bidders' common knowledge of potentially high
gains from collusion. Under the private values treatments where the gains from collusion
were high, collusive tendencies did emerge and increase with bidders' experience; it is ev-
ident from gures 2, 3, 5 and 6 that the dynamics of the private values, high payo gains
experiments (PL experiments at Melbourne and both PL and PH experiments at Caltech)
were quite similar to the common values experiments. On the other hand, we observe that
decreasing gains from collusion contribute to the breakdown of collusive tendencies. In
the PH experiments at Melbourne, where the expected payos from collusion were twice
as low as under the PL treatment, we observed no incidence of collusion.
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We have obtained a strong experimental evidence that the absence of the strict im-
provement rule in ascending price oral auctions can be very favorable for bidder collusion
and equally detrimental for auctioneer's revenue. Bid matching was the most widely used
collusive method that was easily adopted by both inexperienced and well-trained subjects.
Interestingly, however, we found that bidder collusion did not aect the market eciency
in our experiments to the extent predicted by the theory.
We found that the subjects' ability to achieve and sustain collusion increased with
their previous training in other experimental markets. Caltech experiments resulted in
higher bidder collusion than Melbourne experiments, and Caltech subjects were able to
adopt a broader variety of collusive schemes than Melbourne subjects. This suggests
that although the absence of the bid improvement rule signicantly facilitates bidder
collusion, one could expect well-trained bidders to engage in tacit collusion even under
less \favorable" institutional arrangements (see also footnote 2 in section 1). Investigation
of other institutional features that help to safeguard against bidder collusion in ascending
auctions with a small number of bidders would constitute an interesting topic for further
research.
Appendix
FIGURES 2-6 HERE
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List of gures
Figure 1 The dynamics of mean per period market competitiveness, by treatment.
Above: Melbourne experiments; below: Caltech experiments.
Figure 2 The dynamics of market competitiveness in the common values, complete
information experiments, Melbourne. Comp: average market competitiveness; Match:
percentage of collusive-type matches in the end-of period bids.
Figure 3 Figure 2. The dynamics of market competitiveness in the private values,
low asymmetry experiments, Melbourne. Comp: average market competitiveness; Match:
percentage of collusive-type matches in the end-of period bids.
Figure 4 The dynamics of market competitiveness in the private values, high asymmetry
experiments, Melbourne. Comp: average market competitiveness; Match: percentage of
collusive-type matches in the end-of period bids.
Figure 5 Figure 2. The dynamics of market competitiveness in the private values,
low asymmetry experiments, Caltech. Comp: average market competitiveness; Match:
percentage of collusive-type matches in the end-of period bids.
Figure 6 The dynamics of market competitiveness in the private values, high asymmetry
experiments, Caltech. Comp: average market competitiveness; Match: percentage of
collusive-type matches in the end-of period bids.
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Figure 6: Private values, high asymmetry experiments, Caltech
PH-1 CIT: Comp=20.40%, Match=87.5%
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PH-2 CIT: Comp=42.50%, Match=5.9%
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PH-3 CIT: Comp=19.37%, Match=18.8%
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PH-4 CIT: Comp=95.98%, Match=12.5%
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